BUYING INFLUENCE

How Private Prison Companies Expand Their Control of America’s Criminal Justice System

IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST

OCTOBER 2016
About the Programs Not Profits Campaign

The following report is part of In the Public Interest’s Programs Not Profits campaign. Each year, the private corrections industry collects hundreds of millions of dollars in profits from taxpayers. To strengthen safety and justice in our communities, we should invest that money in improving and expanding treatment and rehabilitation programs. Programs Not Profits is a multi-year campaign that promotes replacing private profits that hurt incarcerated people, correctional officers, and taxpayers, with publicly funded and managed programs that provide job training, mental health care, and substance abuse treatment. Follow along and get involved at www.programsnotprofits.org.

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In the Public Interest is a comprehensive research and policy center committed to promoting the values, vision, and agenda for the common good and democratic control of public goods and services. We are committed to equipping citizens, public officials, advocacy groups, and researchers with information, ideas, and resources on best practices in government contracting and other types of public-private agreements. Our goal is to ensure that government contracts and agreements and related public policies increase transparency, accountability, efficiency, and shared prosperity and opportunity through the provision of quality public goods, services, and assets. For more information, please visit www.inthepublicinterest.org.

Acknowledgments

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Any errors or omissions in this report are the sole responsibility of In the Public Interest.
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Executive summary

Every year, private prison and other corrections companies spend millions of dollars influencing public officials. Whether advocating for legislation that benefits their business models, making campaign contributions to candidates, or seeking new contracts, private prison companies' government-relations arms aim to expand the role the companies play in America’s criminal justice system. In 2014, the two largest private prison companies in the U.S., Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and GEO Group, spent at least $5.9 million on lobbying and contributions to campaigns.¹

Since private prison companies' revenues come from government contracts, when CCA and GEO Group spend money influencing public officials, taxpayers in effect pay for these companies to grow their businesses.

Corrections companies have a track record of human rights abuses. In an effort to maximize profits, private prison companies and the companies that provide other corrections services like health care and food cut corners, creating environments that are more violent and counterproductive to rehabilitation.

If government agencies insourced the services provided by corrections companies and shuttered private prisons, they could help alleviate the atrocities endemic behind bars. Additionally, the tax dollars the companies spend influencing public officials could be invested instead in programs to rehabilitate people who are incarcerated and keep at-risk people out of the criminal justice system.

Key findings in this report show that corrections companies wield a broad range of influence:

- During the 2013 and 2014 election years, the corrections industry contributed more than $2.5 million dollars to 360 candidates running for state offices. In 2014, out of the 30 governors, lieutenant governors, controllers, attorney generals, and legislators that received individual contributions of $5,000 or greater from the corrections industry, 27 won their races.

- During the 2014 election cycle, CCA contributed to 23 senators and 25 representatives in the House, and GEO Group contributed to 10 senators and 28 representatives. In 2014, out of the 17 senators and representatives that received contributions of $5,000 or greater from CCA or GEO Group, 14 won their races.
In 2015, CCA hired 102 lobbyists in 25 states and GEO Group hired 79 lobbyists in 15 states. Community Education Centers (CEC), Corizon Correctional Healthcare, Global Tel*Link (GTL), and MHM Services—companies that provide services to the criminal justice system—likely hired more than 150 lobbyists at the state level.

In 2015, CCA and GEO Group hired 20 lobbyists in Washington, D.C., paying them a combined $1.6 million. Seventy percent of their lobbyists had previously worked in congressional offices.

This report explores these and more ways corrections companies influence public officials. It is divided into three sections, each of which studies a separate avenue of influence: (1) campaign contributions, (2) lobbying, and (3) professional corrections associations.

Avenue of Influence #1: Campaign contributions from private prison companies

Corrections companies spend millions on political campaigns to help elect candidates partial to privatizing the criminal justice system. In places with pay-to-play politics, campaign contributions also allow the companies to be considered for government contracts. Additionally, for corporate executives, political contributions to small fundraising events allow them to build relationships with public officials before the officials are elected.

This section is divided into three parts, each exploring how prison companies make contributions to candidates running for offices at a different level of government: (1) state level, (2) federal level, and (3) local level. For a list of sources, see the methodology.

State campaign contributions

During the 2013 and 2014 election years the corrections industry contributed more than $2.5 million dollars to 360 candidates running for state offices. The two largest private prison companies, GEO Group and Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), contributed a combined $2.0 million. (See Table 1.) GEO Group’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO), George Zoley, contributed $97,000, and CCA’s CEO, Damon Hininger, contributed $9,000. Several companies that provide services to prisons, such as prisoner health care company Armor Correctional, and prisoner phone and video call service provider Global Tel*Link (GTL), also contributed to state elections.
Corrections companies have been successful at helping elect state-level candidates. In 2014, out of the 30 governors, lieutenant governors, controllers, attorney generals, and legislators that received individual contributions of $5,000 or greater from the corrections industry, 27 won their races.

During the 2013 and 2014 election years, the corrections industry made the largest contributions to candidates running for governor in states with private prisons. Jerry Brown in California received $91,200, Nathan Deal in Georgia received $61,750, and Greg Abbott in Texas received $55,000.

Corrections companies have supported state-level candidates who promote the privatization of the criminal justice system. For instance, after GEO Group contributed $43,750 to Bill Richardson's successful 2006 campaign for governor of New Mexico, the company secured a contract to incarcerate the state's prisoners at the Northeast New Mexico Detention Facility. After GEO Group contributed $21,200 to Arnold Schwarzenegger's successful 2003 campaign for governor of California, the company was able to reopen its McFarland facility north of Los Angeles with prisoners from the state. After Armor Correctional Health Services contributed $25,000 to Terry McAuliffe's successful 2013 campaign for governor of Virginia, the company secured a contract to provide medical care to Virginia's prisoners. Jose Armas, the president of Armor Correctional contributed $10,000 to the campaign.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>State Campaign Contributions during 2013 and 2014 Election Cycles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GEO Group</td>
<td>Facility operator</td>
<td>$1,421,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrections Corporation of America (CCA)</td>
<td>Facility operator</td>
<td>$598,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor Correctional Health Services</td>
<td>Prisoner health care</td>
<td>$80,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Tel*Link (GTL)</td>
<td>Prisoner phone and video call services</td>
<td>$58,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHM Services</td>
<td>Prisoner health care</td>
<td>$35,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Education Centers (CEC)</td>
<td>Facility operator</td>
<td>$33,083</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Federal campaign contributions

As of June 27, 2016, GEO Group had contributed $464,000 and CCA had contributed $210,000 to the 2016 congressional and presidential races. (See Tables 2 and 3.) GEO Group was the fifth largest contributor to Senator Marco Rubio’s reelection campaign, contributing $38,250.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party and State</th>
<th>Campaign Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>Marco Rubio</td>
<td>R-FL</td>
<td>$35,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House</td>
<td>Rebecca Negron</td>
<td>R-FL</td>
<td>$32,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>Pat Toomey</td>
<td>R-PA</td>
<td>$21,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House</td>
<td>Henry Cuellar</td>
<td>D-TX</td>
<td>$15,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House</td>
<td>John Culberson</td>
<td>R-TX</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>Mike Lee</td>
<td>R-UT</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>Carlos Lopez-Cantera</td>
<td>R-FL</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>Tim Scott</td>
<td>R-SC</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House</td>
<td>Kevin Brady</td>
<td>R-TX</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House</td>
<td>Carlos Curbelo</td>
<td>R-FL</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House</td>
<td>Justin Grabelle</td>
<td>R-FL</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House</td>
<td>Patrick Mooney</td>
<td>R-FL</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>Rob Portman</td>
<td>R-OH</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House</td>
<td>Steven Russell</td>
<td>R-OK</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>Jeanne Shaheen</td>
<td>D-NH</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table shows the candidates that have received at least $5,000 from GEO Group.

CCA and GEO Group have been successful at helping elect decision makers to seats in Washington, D.C. In 2014, out of the 17 senators and congressmen that received contributions of $5,000 or greater from CCA or GEO Group, 14 won their races.

GEO Group was Texas Congressman Henry Cuellar’s largest donor in the 2014 election, contributing $15,500, and as of September 12, 2016, GEO Group was Cuellar’s largest donor in the 2016 election as well, contributing $15,090. Being in good favor with Congressman Cuellar is of special importance to the company. Cuellar sits on the Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, which has set the number of beds Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) must keep for immigrants at 34,000.

This bed quota is a large source of revenue for GEO Group as the company manages five of the ten largest ICE facilities. Additionally, Cuellar’s district is home to GEO Group’s Rio Grande Detention Center, which has a capacity of 1,900 and is used to incarcerate U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) prisoners.

### Local campaign contributions

**While available campaign expenditure data for cities and counties** are more limited than data for states and the federal government, anecdotal evidence shows that corrections companies also influence elections at the local level.

In June 2014, GTL became involved in local elections when two Orange County, California, supervisors came out in opposition to the high prisoner call fees charged by the company. Shortly after, GTL contributed the maximum, $1,900, to one of the supervisors, and in October, GTL contributed the maximum to the other supervisor. When the vote came in November, the two supervisors flipped their positions, giving GTL the majority of votes needed to secure the contract. In total, GTL, its lobbyists, and other people connected to the company contributed $85,000 to the supervisors who approved GTL’s contract.
Avenue of Influence #2: Lobbying by private prison companies

Corrections companies hire lobbyists in states across the country and Washington, D.C., to influence public decisions that benefit their bottom lines. For some corrections companies, their lobbying budgets—which pay for lobbyists both in-house and at lobbying firms—total several millions of dollars.

This section is divided into two parts, each exploring how prison companies lobby decision makers at a different level of government: (1) state level and (2) federal level. For a list of sources, see the methodology.

State lobbying

Every year, corrections companies send lobbyists to state capitals across the country to advocate for policies that benefit their business. In 2015, CCA hired 121 lobbyists in 25 states and GEO Group hired 79 lobbyists in 15 states. (See Table 4.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CCA Lobbyists</th>
<th>CCA States</th>
<th>GEO Group Lobbyists</th>
<th>GEO Group States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Corrections companies have been able to secure contracts in places where they have a heavy lobbying presence. In 2015, CCA hired nine lobbyists in Hawaii, which renewed its contract with CCA in 2016 with plans to increase the number of people held at the company’s Saguaro prison in Arizona by 250 (as of August 2016). The new contract also increased the state’s payments to CCA to $71.90 per prisoner per day. GEO Group hired 14 lobbyists in Florida, home to the company’s headquarters and six prisons, and 14 lobbyists in Pennsylvania, home to half of the company’s facilities for juveniles.

CCA and GEO Group spend millions of dollars to hire these lobbyists. Since many lobby disclosure reports require lobbyists to record their compensation in ranges instead of exact values, there is not a specific number for the dollars spent on lobbyists. Rather, disclosure reports show that in 2015, CCA and GEO Group spent between $1.7 and $2.5 million lobbying in nine states in which the companies contract to incarcerate prisoners—California, Florida, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont. (See Table 5.)
Table 5: Private prison companies spend millions of dollars lobbying in nine states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CCA</th>
<th>GEO Group</th>
<th>CCA and GEO Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower Limit</td>
<td>Upper Limit</td>
<td>Lower Limit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>$1.3 million</td>
<td>$1.7 million</td>
<td>$900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>$1.3 million</td>
<td>$1.5 million</td>
<td>$800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$1.1 million</td>
<td>$1.4 million</td>
<td>$600,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table presents CCA’s and GEO Group’s lobbying spending as a range between the lower limit and upper limit. Nine states include California, Florida, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont.

Corrections companies that provide services to the criminal justice system also lobby at the state level. In 2015, CEC, Corizon Correctional Healthcare, GTL, and MHM Services together likely hired more than 150 lobbyists.17 (See Table 6.) Corizon had an especially strong presence in New York and Florida, where the company hired 19 lobbyists and 10 lobbyists, respectively. GTL had an especially strong presence in Michigan and California, hiring 23 and 11 lobbyists, respectively.

Table 6: Corrections companies that provide services to the criminal justice system lobby across the country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Community Education Centers (CEC)</th>
<th>Corizon Correctional Healthcare</th>
<th>Global Tel*Link (GTL)</th>
<th>MHM Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lobbyists</td>
<td>States</td>
<td>Lobbyists</td>
<td>States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Corrections companies that provide services to the criminal justice system generally concentrate their lobbying in a few key states. In Florida, for example, companies that provide prisoner health care, phone and video call, commissary, and community corrections services hired at least 41 lobbyists for an estimated $1.3 million in 2015. (See Table 7.)

Table 7: Correctional service companies likely spent over $1.0 million lobbying in Florida in 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Lobbyists</th>
<th>Estimated Lobbying Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corizon Correctional Healthcare</td>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>$280,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Tel*Link (GTL)</td>
<td>Phone and video call</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$230,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correct Care Solutions</td>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>$220,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor Correctional Health Services</td>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>$160,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securus Technologies</td>
<td>Phone and video call</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keefe Group</td>
<td>Commissary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Education Centers (CEC)</td>
<td>Community Corrections</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centurion Managed Care</td>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>$45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wexford Health Sources</td>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Supply Group</td>
<td>Commissary</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>$30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>$1,335,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Florida lobbying disclosure reports require filers to provide a range for expenditures. The expenditures presented here are the middle points of those ranges for each company. Also note that the number of lobbyists and the lobbying expenditures data come from two different sources. In some instances, the number of lobbyists is marked as "NA" because the source is incomplete. For a list of sources, see the methodology.
Federal lobbying

CCA and GEO Group hire lobbyists in Washington, D.C., to shape policies and influence decisions to the benefit of their business. These lobbyists conduct most of their work for CCA and GEO Group in the halls of Congress but also support the companies’ interests at the Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Prisons (BOP), ICE, USMS, and other executive branch agencies. In 2015, CCA and GEO Group spent a combined $1.6 million to hire a total of 20 lobbyists. (See Table 8.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CCA</th>
<th>GEO Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lobbying Expenditure</td>
<td>Total Lobbyists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>$1,120,000</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>$1,020,000</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2015, CCA lobbied on three federal bills that helped ensure a steady flow of prisoners to private facilities and one bill that affects the information private prison companies must disclose to the public:

- **Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act** and Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act direct funds to federal agencies that oversee the incarceration of criminals and immigrants, including the BOP, USMS, and ICE;¹⁸
- **Justice Is Not For Sale Act** would have banned private prisons at the federal, state, and local levels;¹⁹ and
- **Private Prison Information Act** would have removed the exemption that allows private prison companies to avoid disclosing information on violence, demographics, and budgets at their facilities.²⁰

The votes in Congress on these acts—or lack thereof—protected the company’s bottom line. The Justice Is Not for Sale Act, which would have ended contracts for the majority of CCA’s revenue, has not received a vote in committee.²¹ While the 2016 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act has yet to receive a vote, prior iterations of the bill have passed with a mandate that ICE keep 34,000 beds for immigrants—a boon to CCA considering the company holds 9,200 of those beds.²² The Private Prison Information Act, which would have compelled CCA to disclose information on the percent of taxpayer dollars it collects as profits, did not receive a vote in committee.²³

Many of CCA’s and GEO Group’s lobbyists have close ties to decision makers on Capitol Hill. In 2015, 70 percent of their lobbyists had previously worked in congressional offices. (See “Revolving Door Lobbyists” in Table 8.) For example, Robert Russell, who served as Arkansas
Senator Mark Pryor’s chief of staff for seven years, received $80,000 from CCA to lobby on its behalf. GEO Group’s wholly owned subsidiary BI Inc. hired former 10-term Louisiana Congressman Jim McCrery to lobby on its behalf. Other notable “revolving door” lobbyists hired by CCA or GEO Group in 2015 include:

- Ryan Thompson, former chief of staff for Oklahoma Senator James Inhofe;
- Hayden Rogers, former chief of staff for both West Virginia Senator Joe Manchin and North Carolina Congressman Heath Shuler;
- Nicole Venable, former advisor and chief of staff for Louisiana Congressman William Jefferson;
- Drew Goesl, former communications director for Arkansas Senator Blanche Lincoln and former chief of staff for Arkansas Congressman Mike Ross;
- Richard Sullivan, former National Finance Director for the Democratic National Committee; and
- Chris Cox, former Legislative Director for Georgia Senator Saxby Chambliss.

Additionally, in August 2016, CCA appointed Stacia Hylton to its board of directors. Between 2010 and 2015, Hylton was the director of the USMS, which incarcerated 31 percent of its prisoners in private facilities as of 2013.

Avenue of Influence #3: Professional corrections associations

Professional corrections associations are nonprofit organizations that support corrections officials, including wardens, administrators, state Department of Corrections staff, sheriffs, and others. These associations hold annual conferences, in which corrections officials come together for professional development, networking, and entertainment. The American Jail Association’s (AJA) conference averages 1,100 attendees, and the National Sheriffs’ Association’s (NSA) conference averages 2,300-2,800 attendees.

As detailed in In the Public Interest’s 2015 report, “Buying Access,” corrections companies use these conferences to build influence with decision makers. In 2014, the corrections industry contributed at least $3 million to five of the largest professional corrections associations, including the American Correctional Association (ACA), the Association of State Correctional Administrators (ASCA), the Corrections Technology Association (CTA), the AJA, and the NSA. The corrections industry makes these contributions through:

- Sponsorships: Companies generally pay between $5,000 and $10,000, and sometimes as much as $30,000, to provide professional corrections associations’
annual conferences with operating funds, or to support specific conference events such as banquets, luncheons, and promotional merchandise.

- **Vendor fees**: Hundreds of companies generally pay between $1,400 and $2,400 to manage vendor booths at conferences.

- **Advertisements**: Corrections corporations pay professional corrections associations usually between $500 and $3,000 to place advertisements in conference program books and manuals.

- **General support contributions**: Companies donate money to professional corrections associations to support their general operations.

In return for contributions to professional corrections associations, corrections companies are able to build relationships with and influence decision makers in key ways:

- Corrections companies send executives and staff to professional corrections association conferences to meet decision makers. Many companies receive lists of attendees, allowing their staff to target certain corrections officials. At ACA’s summer conference in 2014, CCA sent nearly 70 of its employees.

- Corrections companies lead trainings and workshops at conferences, often times directly marketing their goods and services. In 2014, company representatives led 18 of the CTA conference’s 24 workshops. In one workshop, JPay taught attendees about the benefits of the company’s VideoGram service.

- Corrections companies host conference events where their executives and marketing staff meet with and give speeches to corrections officials.

- Corrections companies market their products and services at conference vendor booths to identify potential customers and generate leads. At NSA’s 2014 conference, Armor Correctional sponsored a “relaxation station,” which provided massage chairs to attendees. In order to use the chairs, attendees needed to obtain a ticket from the company’s vendor booth.

- Corrections companies advertise on conference materials, such as program books, hotel room key cards, tote bags, and take-home mugs. At ACA’s summer conference in 2014, Management and Training Corporation (MTC), the third largest prison company in the U.S., printed its name on attendees’ hotel keycards.
Policy recommendations

Private prison companies and other corrections companies use campaign contributions, lobbying, and professional corrections associations to expand the role they play in America’s criminal justice system. Once corrections companies receive contracts, their profit-seeking motives create environments that are counterproductive to rehabilitation. To minimize the influence of corrections companies, and protect prisoners and the public, government bodies should undertake the policies outlined below.

To reduce the influence of corrections companies on elections, federal, state, and local governments should adopt the following protections:

• Government bodies should prohibit their contractors from making campaign contributions. These rules should cover the time periods before, during, and after the contract to eliminate the influence of contributions on public officials’ decisions. These rules should apply to the company itself as well as its senior executives and their spouses.

• Government bodies should require contractors to disclose their past campaign contributions—including to 501(c)(4) organizations and Super PACs—in their bids for contracts. Contractors should also disclose campaign contributions made during the contract in their reports submitted to the contracting office. This information should be publicly available.

To monitor the influence of contractors over legislation and policy, federal, state, and local governments should require contractors to disclose the contracts they have won, as well as contract bids they have lost, on their lobbying disclosure reports. Additionally, contractors should disclose lobbying information in their bids for contracts and—if they win a contract—in their reports to contracting offices.

To ensure that corrections companies do not unduly influence government officials through professional corrections associations, the public should be able to monitor companies’ involvement in the associations. Specifically, the associations should publish complete reports that provide details on the contributions from private companies and the benefits the companies receive in return.

Additionally, federal, state, and local governments should adopt best practices for corrections contracts to ensure that the public interest is protected in all agreements with corrections companies. A thorough discussion of these practices can be found in In the Public Interest’s report, “Essential Public Interest Protections for Prison Privatization Contracts.” Examples of these protections include:

• Preventing corrections companies from reducing costs by simply lowering wages or the quality of services;
• Explicitly requiring corrections companies to comply with departmental policies; and

• Allowing the contracting office maximum flexibility with regard to contract cancellations.

With the polices listed above, government bodies can reduce the influence of private companies on America’s criminal justice system, improving the environment for prisoners and protecting the broader public interest.

Methodology

The first six sections below provide the sources of data for each part of this report. The last section explains how In the Public Interest researchers tabulated the $5.9 million in campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures presented in this report’s Executive Summary. In the Public Interest began collecting data in 2015.

State campaign contributions

In the Public Interest obtained state campaign contribution data from the National Institute on Money in State Politics’s (NIMSP) “Ask Anything” online tool (www.followthemoney.org). To access the dataset on the corrections industry, In the Public Interest researchers used the tool’s “Contributions FROM…” feature, selected “Industry(s),” selected “General Business,” selected “Miscellaneous Business,” and then selected “Correctional facilities construction & management/for profit.” All state contribution statistics in this report were obtained from this dataset using the “Data Navigator” feature that is part of the “Ask Anything” tool.

Federal campaign contributions

In the Public Interest obtained federal campaign contribution data from the Center for Responsive Politics’s online database on influence and lobbying (www.opensecrets.org). The Center for Responsive Politics separates data into different categories (e.g., “Lobbying Client,” “PACs,” “Candidate”). Data on CCA’s and GEO Group’s campaign contributions came from the “Organization” category. Data on Senator Marco Rubio’s and Congressman Henry Cuellar’s contributions came from the “Member” category. Note that data for CCA are under the organization name “Corrections Corp of America.”
Local campaign contributions

The anecdote about the Orange County supervisors and other information for this section came from:

- Nick Gerda, “Supervisors Backed Off Criticism of Jail Phones After Contributions From Vendor,” Voice of OC, 17 November 2015; and

State lobbying

In the Public Interest obtained data on the number of state lobbyists from the NIMSP’s “Ask Anything” online tool (www.followthemoney.org). After accessing the dataset on the corrections industry (see “State Campaign Contributions” section above), In the Public Interest researchers selected specific companies to view their lobbyist profiles.

In the Public Interest obtained data on the state lobbying expenditures from the following state-managed lobbying disclosure databases.

- California Secretary of State, Cal-Access (cal-access.ss.ca.gov/Lobbying)
- FloridaLobbyist (floralobbyist.gov)
- Kentucky Legislative Ethics Commission (klec.ky.gov)
- Minnesota Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board (www.cfboard.state.mn.us)
- Mississippi Secretary of State (www.sos.ms.gov/elc/portal/msel/page/search/portal.aspx)
- Pennsylvania Department of State (www.palobbyingservices.state.pa.us)
- Tennessee Ethics Commission (apps.tn.gov/lobbysearch-app/search.htm)
- Texas Ethics Commission (https://www.ethics.state.tx.us/dfs/loblists.htm)
- Vermont Secretary of State, Lobbying Information System: (lobbying.sec.state.vt.us/Public/SearchByEmployer; and www.lobbying.sec.state.vt.us/elections/lobbying/search-prior-biennium-records/employers-2013-2014.aspx)
Federal lobbying

In the Public Interest obtained federal lobbying data from the Center for Responsive Politics's online database on influence and lobbying (www.opensecrets.org). The Center for Responsive Politics separates data into different categories (e.g. “Lobbying Client,” “PACs,” “Candidate”). Data on CCA’s and GEO Group’s lobbying came from the “Lobbying Client” category. Data on CCA’s and GEO Group’s revolving door lobbyists came from the “Lobbyist” category.

Professional corrections associations

All data on the influence of corrections companies on professional corrections associations came from In the Public Interest’s report “Buying Access: How Corporations Influence Decision Makers at Corrections Conferences, Trainings, and Meetings” released in August 2015.

Total campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures for CCA and GEO Group

Using the sources above, In the Public Interest researchers tabulated that CCA and GEO Group spent at least a combined $5.9 million on lobbying and contributions to campaigns in 2014. For state lobbying expenditures that disclosure databases present as a range, In the Public Interest researchers used the lower limit of the range. Table 9 shows the expenditures included in the $5.9 million figure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Level of Government</th>
<th>Type of Expenditure</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GEO Group</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Campaign contribution</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Campaign contribution</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEO Group</td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>Campaign contribution</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>Campaign contribution</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEO Group</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Lobbying</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Lobbying</td>
<td>$1,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEO Group</td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>Lobbying</td>
<td>$650,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>Lobbying</td>
<td>$1,020,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: CCA and GEO Group spent at least $5.9 million influencing public officials in 2014.
Endnotes

1 For how $5.9 million was tabulated, see the methodology.
4 Virginia Department of Corrections, "VADOC Selects Armor Correctional Health Services for Interim Offender Health Care Services" (press release), 8 July 2014.
6 Note: For 2014, In the Public Interest researchers rounded to $500,000.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
17 According to the data source, the listed companies hired a combined 162 lobbyists. However, lobbyists that work for the same company in different states or lobbyists that work for different companies in the same state may be double counted.
20 Alex Park, "Will Private Prisons Finally Be Subject to the Freedom of Information Act?" Mother Jones, 16 December 2014.
26 Data for this section come from In the Public Interest, "Buying Access: How Corporations Influence Decision Makers at Corrections Conferences, Trainings, and Meetings," August 2015.